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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Corporate Reorganization under Section 77B-Right of a
Conditional Vendor to Reclaim Personal Property from the DebtorDebtor corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Section 77B 1 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 2 The order approving the petition restrained all
persons from interfering with the property of the debtor pending reorganization.
Conditional vendors moved for the return of certain machinery held by the
debtor under recorded conditional sale agreements, upon which the debtor had
defaulted. Held (one Justice dissenting), that the motion be granted, since the
debtor had no "property" in the chattels. In re Lake's Laundry, N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 25, 1935, at 923 (C. C. A. 2d). Held, that the vendor's reclamation be
restrained for sixty days to permit reorganization. In re Ideal Laundry, IO F.
Supp. 719 (N. D. Cal. 1935).
Section 77B permits an insolvent corporation to reorganize where under
the original statute it would have been required to go into bankruptcy.3 Pending reorganization, the court may permit the debtor to remain in possession 4 of
all its "property";s and it may restrain creditors from enforcing any interest,
claim or lien. 6 The statute is designed to protect creditors from the consequences of a forced liquidation, and to aid general business conditions by
enabling corporations to continue operating.7 In re Lake's Laundry partially
frustrates these purposes of the amendment, for to deprive the corporation of
essential operating equipment is to defeat the purposes of reorganization. It is
true that a conditional vendee gets no "title" under a conditional sale agreement
which conforms to the requirements of state law; 8 but it seems apparent that
the vendee obtains some "property" in the chattel, for he acquires several of
the incidents of ownership. The court seemed to be influenced by the fact that
a conditional vendor may reclaim chattels from a trustee in bankruptcy on the
theory that the bankrupt had no "property" in the goods 10 within the meaning
of that term as used in the Bankruptcy Act.11 But the situations are not
analogous. To refuse the vendor reclamation where the corporation has gone
into bankruptcy would violate the conditional sale contract by denying the
vendor more than the share of a general creditor. Under Section 77B, however,
the "interest, claim, or lien" is adequately protected, for it survives intact against
the reorganized corporation and its property where
the court feels it should
"equitably and fairly provide such protection." 12 Rights are merely postponed
I. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), ix U. S. C. A. § 2o7 (Supp. 1934).

2. 30 id. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. (,927).
3. 30 id. 545 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § 11 (1927).
4.48 id. 916, 917c (, 11) (934), I U. S. C. A. §207c (1, II) (Supp. 1934).
5. 48 id.914b (io) (1934), 1I U. S. C. A. §2o7b (io) (Supp. 1934).
6. 48 id. 917c (10) (934), II U. S. C. A. §207c (10) (Supp. 1934).
7. Campbell v. Allegheny Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Heffernan, Cor-

porate Reorgacizationunder the Bankruptcy Act (1935) IO IND. L. J. 386.
8. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915) ; Interstate Ice & Power
Corp. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 243 N. Y. 95, 152 N. E. 476 (1926).
9. The most important incidents are the right to possession, the risk of loss and the benefits of gain. See i Wn.Lisrox, SALEs (2d ed. 1934) § 330, 334.

io. Nauman v. Bradshaw, 193 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; In. re Remson Mfg. Co.,

227

Fed. 207 (E. D. N. Y., 1915) ; 2 REmiNGroN, BANRrauPrcY (2d ed. 1915) § 1878.
II. 30 STAT. 557 (1898), 1I U. S. C. A. §75 (1927).
12. 48 id. 914 (I934), II U. S. C. A. §207b (5) (Supp. 1934).
(250)

RECENT CASES

that reorganization may be effected. 18 This distinction between bankruptcy
proceedings and corporate reorganization justifies a broader interpretation of
"property" as used in connection with the latter. In the Idea! Laundry case, the
court reached the more practical result by restraining the reclamation temporarily; but it needlessly added that the vendee had no "property" in the
chattels. It would seem more appropriate to bring these factual situations
directly within the Act by holding that the debtor has "property" in the chattel
for the purposes of 77B.

Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Constitutionality of State
Occupation Tax on Gross Income of Radio Broadcasting Stations-State of
Washington levied an annual one per cent tax on gross income for the privilege
of engaging in business activities, specifically including broadcasting stations.1
Plaintiff, a domestic radio broadcasting corporation, sought to enjoin the defendant tax commission from enforcing the tax against it. Held (one judge
dissenting), that the radio broadcasting corporation was not engaged in interstate commerce, and that therefore the tax was not in contravention of the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Fisher'sBlend Station v.
Tax Commission of Washington, 45 P. (2d) 942 (Wash. 1935).
It is well-settled that for purposes of regulation by the Federal Radio
Commission, radio broadcasting is interstate commerce.3 The instant case decided, by analogy to the bridge toll cases, 4 that for the purpose of a state occupation tax levied on gross income, radio broadcasting is intrastate commerce. That
operation of an interstate bridge does not constitute interstate commerce, for
purposes of state taxation, was very recently reiterated by the United States
Supreme Court in sustaining a gross receipts tax thereon. 5 The Court based
its decision on an earlier case of very doubtful logic which had declared that a
corporation operating a bridge does not engage in interstate commerce, although
the people crossing it may." The instant court, using similar reasoning, proi3. It is important that the special rights of a conditional vendor be not destroyed, for
destruction would result in a refusal to lease or conditionally sell to any but the soundest of
corporations. The same problem has arisen under Section 77, which provides for railroad
reorganization. Under equipment trust agreements, which are leases or conditional sales to
the railroad of rolling stock, it was doubtful if the rights of the vendor or lessor would not
be destroyed. This doubt made it impossible for unstable corporations to acquire necessary
equipment. P. L. No. 381, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (935), Section 77 (j), was therefore passed,
stipulating that nothing in the Act should be construed to affect the "rights" of vendors or
lessors under equipment trust agreements. But here again no material .iarm will be done if
the courts postpone reclamation proceedings until the railroad's reorganization is completed.
i. WAsxr. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1934) §§ 8326-I to 8326-30.
2. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D. Ill. 1929),
aff'd, 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 31 F. (2d) 63o (App. D. C. 1929). Even where purposes other than regulation are
concerned, the courts in the few cases that have come before them have generally held that
radio broadcasting is interstate commerce. Van Dusen v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 158
Wash. 414, 290 Pac. 8o3 (i93o) (workman injured while removing telephone switchboard
from broadcasting room .held engaged in interstate commerce); WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F.
(2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931), 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1148 (state tax on radio receiving sets
held unconstitutional) ; Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787 (E. D. Ky. 1927) (municipal
license fee on operation of broadcasting station declared unconstitutional) ; cf. City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University, 178 Ga. 379, 173 S. E. 110 (1934).
4. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 15o (1897); Detroit International
Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Bd. of Michigan, 294 U. S. 83 (1935).

5. Ibid.
6. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 66 U. S. 150 (1897). The court was divided
very sharply five to four, and the majority cited no authority for its proposition.
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ceeded in this manner: The broadcasting company completes its business operations by making available its facilities to commercial advertisers. Thereafter,
the advertiser when he broadcasts is engaged in interstate commerce; but the
company, having already fulfilled its obligations, is not. Obviously, from a
factual viewpoint the court's reasoning is faulty. In order to insure the transmission of a message it is necessary for the broadcasting company constantly
to employ technicians, operators, etc., to regulate the power, volume and clarity
of tone. Such a situation is hardly comparable to bridge operation where, once
the bridge is constructed and made ready for use, the one crossing the bridge
needs generally no aid from the operating company to get to the other side.
Rather, it would seem, the proper analogy is to the telephone and telegraph
cases, where for the purpose of invalidating state occupation taxes the United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that the corporation supplying the
facilities over which the intelligence was transmitted was engaged in interstate
commerce.7 Factually, there is a great similarity in the quality of company aid
necessary for insuring the reception of telephone messages and of radio broadcasts. If the analogy is valid, it appears that the tax in the instant case was
imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, and was therefore
violative of the commerce clause.

Constitutional Law-Intoxicating Liquors-Validity under 21st
Amendment of State Statute Forbidding Importation of Liquor unless
Registered in United States Patent Office-Plaintiffs imported into Minnesota liquor which had been manufactured abroad. They brought suits in equity
for an interlocutory injunction against defendant Liquor Control Commissioner
to prevent enforcement of a Minnesota statute forbidding importation of intoxicating liquors unless the brand was registered in the United States Patent
Office.1 The statute permitted the sale of unregistered brands of liquor manufactured in Minnesota. Held, that interlocutory injunctions be granted, because
the statute violates the commerce clause 2 and the equal protection clause 8 of
the federal Constitution. Joseph Triner Corp. v. Arundel; Frank McCormick
v. Arundel, ii F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1935).
Section 2 of the 2Ist Amendment, 4 the court in the instant cases held, does

not except liquor from the commerce clause nor permit states to exclude liquor
from interstate commerce, but merely prohibits Congress from permitting shipment of liquor into states in violation of the laws thereof. This result is probably correct, since Congress has the sole power to regulate interstate commerce,
and any Amendment limiting the regulation of interstate commerce could be
addressed only to it. Section 2 thus becomes of little moment as a protection
to "dry" states,5 whose residents will doubtless now invoke the commerce clause
to defeat state regulation of the liquor traffic, as they did successfully before
189o.6 But the court in the instant case overlooked a more effective protection
7. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888) ; Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 U. S. 384 (0935).
i. Minn. Laws 1935, c. 390.
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
3. Id. AmEND. XIV, § i.

4. Id. AEiEND. XXI, § 2, provides: "The transportation or importation into any State
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited."
5. See Rockwell, Modification or Repeal and the Webb-Kenyon Act (1932) 35 LAW
NoTvS 207.

6. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. IOO (189o).
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for state liquor regulation. The Wilson Act, 7 the Webb-Kenyon Act 8 and the
Reed Amendment 9 divested liquor of its interstate character in the situations
covered by the statutes, by giving states the right to exclude liquor from their
borders.' 0 Since these statutes were not inconsistent with the National Prohibition Act,:" they could scarcely have been repealed by that Act. The objection that the statute in the instant case violated the commerce clause would
therefore seem unfounded.' 2 As for the second ground of the court's holding,
state liquor legislation always has been subject to the equal protection clause,'3
and nothing in the 21st Amendment changes this rule. But it does not follow
that the statute in the instant case denied foreign distillers the same protection
given domestic distillers. State legislation need only be equally applicable to all
Defendant might possibly have shown that domestic dissimilarly situated."
tillers are differently placed in that they are subject to sanitary and inspection
laws which do not apply to foreign distillers. This difference (if it existed)
would bear a substantial relation to the subject of the statute; 1 for in the case
of domestic distillers the sanitary and inspection laws may prevent the sale of
inferior liquor, and therefore-if it be granted that registration of brands will
tend to have the same effect-such registration need be required only of foreign
distillers, whom the sanitary laws cannot reach.' 6
Corporations-Corporate Powers and Liabilities-Right of Corporation to Plead Defense of Ultra Vires When No Benefits Have Been Received from the Contract-Appellant bank agreed by resolution of its board
of directors that if appellee bank would lend debtor an additional sum of money,
7. 26 STAT. 313, c. 728 (890), 27 U. S. C. A. 4 (1926)
toxicating liquors transported into any State . . . for use
shall . . . be subject . . . to the laws of such State .
as though such . . . liquors had been produced in such State

provides that "all . . . insale or storage therein
. .
. . to the same extent . . .
. . . and shall not be exempt

therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages."
8. 37 STAT. 699, c. 9o (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. 4 (1926), entitled "An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases," provides that "the shipment
• . . of intoxicating liquors . . . from one State into any other . . . which intoxicatig liquor is intended . . . to be received, possessed, sold . . . or used, either in the

original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, is hereby prohibited."
9. 39 STAT. io69, c. 162, § 5 (1917), 27 U. S. C. A. 4 (1926), provides that "whoever
shall . . . cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce . . . into

any State the laws of which prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors
shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, that nothing herein shall authorize the shipment of
liquor into any State contrary to the laws thereof."
io. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891), upholds the constitutionality of the Wilson Act,
the Court saying at 562: "No reason is perceived why if Congress chooses to provide that
certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests
them of that character at an earlier period than would otherwise be the case, it is not within
its competency to do so." Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (ii6),
held that the "Webb-Kenyon Act is a legitimate exertion of the power to regulate commerce."
United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (ii8), decided that the Reed Amendment was within
the power of Congress under the commerce clause.
II. 42 STAT. 223, c. 134, §5 (1921), 27 U. S. C. A. §3 (1926).
12. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17 (1905), decided that under the
Wilson Act a Missouri statute which required foreign beer to be inspected before entering the state was not an interference with Congress' power over interstate commerce.
13. Eberle v. People, 167 Mich. 477, 133 N. W. 519 (1911), aff'd, 232 U. S. 700 (1914).
But see Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 2o AtI. 9o5 (189o).
14. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 333 (1921).
I5. The test usually given. See Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 49o, 493
(1928).
16. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 12o Fed. i44 (C. C. D. Mo. 19o3), af'd, i98 U. S.
(a Missouri statute requiring all imported beer to bear a label listing the ingre17 (195o)
dients, but exempting domestic beer from its provisions, held to be no violation of the equal
protection clause) ; see Murray v. City of Battle Creek, 269 Mich. 249, 257 N. W. 696 (934).
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appellant would subordinate to appellee's lien, a prior lien which the former held
on debtor's real estate. The debtor was a corporation whose entire capital stock
was owned by one family, which also owned three-quarters of the capital stock
of the appellant bank, and whose salaried manager was also the president of the
bank. Appellee lent the money, and at default of the debtor started proceedings to foreclose its lien on the lands in question. Held, that the resolution of
the board of directors was ultra vires, and that since no benefits were received
by appellant, it was not estopped to set it up as a defense. Hamburg Bank v.
Ouachita Nat. Bank, 78 F. (2d) Ioo (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
The court in the present case followed the rule in the majority of state
jurisdictions-which is not, strictly speaking, the federal rule or the principle
laid down by the United States Supreme Court," although it has been enunciated
in certain lower federal courts.2 It is necessary to distinguish between those corporate acts which are ultra vires-that is to say, beyond the enumerated powers
given to the corporation by its charter-and those acts which are in contravention
of an express provision in a statute or in the corporation's charter. The latter are
illegal, and the rule that illegal contracts are void is applied to them.3 Contracts
which are in the first class, when they have been executed by one party, and
where the other party has received the benefit of such performance, are held
valid by the majority of courts, which rule that the corporation is estopped to
set up the defense of ultra vires.4 The United States Supreme Court and a few
other jurisdictions, however, hold that such contracts are void, and that estoppel
will not operate; but do allow an action in the nature of a quantum meruit for
recovery of the benefits received. 5 Although the contract in the present case
was merely ultra vires, not illegal, and although it had been executed by one
party, it has regularly been held that receipt of benefits, as here, by a third party,
is not sufficient to estop a corporation from setting up the defense of ultra vires.6
The court in the instant case held this rule to be applicable, notwithstanding the
fact that appellant bank and debtor corporation were controlled by the same
family. Though the court came to this conclusion with reluctance, that reluctance apparently bore no relation to its departure from the rule of its own
jurisdiction, for the result would have been the same whether the federal rule
or the rule of the majority was applied.
Corporations-Treasury Shares-Status of Shareholder Who Sold
Shares to Corporation in Return for Note and Same Shares as SecurityDelaware corporation under statute I purchased shares of its own stock from
i. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 (18go) (doctrine of estoppel expressly refuted and all ultra vires contracts described as void).
2. it re Steele Furniture Co., iS F. (2d)i 490 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; Hummel v. Steel
Casting Co., 5 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
3. 7 FixErcHER, CYcLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNs (Perm. ed. 1931) 34oo.
4. Becker Provision Co. v. Parker Hardware Co., 146 Ark. 539, 226 S. W. 177 (1920);
Downs v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 351, 174 Atl. 887 (1934); Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417, 33 N. E. 472 (1893) ; Ketchum v. Conneaut Lake Co., 309
Pa. 224, 163 Atl. 534 (1932).
5. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 (189o) ; Abbott
v. Wolfeborough Savings Bank, 68 N. H. 290, 38 Atl. 1050 (1895) ; Hermitage Hotel Co. v.
Dyer, 125 Tenn. 302, 143 S. W. 1117 (1911).
6. Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass. 585, 144 N. E. 749 (1924); Morris v.
Ernest Wiener Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 163 (19o9). This rule has been applied to ultra vires
contracts of guaranty where the corporation has received no benefits from the guaranty.
Evans v. Johnson, 149 Fed. 978 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6) ; Deaton Grocery Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 267, 105 S. W. 556 (29o7) ; Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 479.

i.

DEL. CORP. LAW (1932)
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plaintiff, the latter receiving in return cash, a note, and the same stock as security for the note. The note was reduced from time to time until the subsequent
insolvency of the corporation. In bankruptcy proceedings a claim for the unpaid portion of the note was disallowed. Held, that the disallowance was proper,
because the plaintiff was not a general creditor. In re Vulcan Soot Cleaner
Co., ii F. Supp. 388 (W. D. Pa. 1935).
There is dogma, 2 occasionally contradicted," that a shareholder who sells a
corporation its own stock and receives a note in return cannot recover as a general creditor in bankruptcy, regardless of the financial condition of the corporation at the time of issuance of the note. The courts adhering to this dogma 4
reason according to the following formula: The statutes governing a corporation's
purchase of its own stock are designed to protect creditors. 5 At insolvency, the
assets of a corporation become a trust fund for creditors. Since the vendor of
shares to the corporation is not a creditor, the trust fund is closed to him. But
no reason is suggested for deeming such a vendor not a creditor. Moreover,
the fact that the holder of a note for treasury shares has none of the advantages of a shareholder, suggests that the rejection of the dogma is desirable.
The result in the instant case, however, despite the court's reliance on this doctrinaire theory, seems to be correct, because of the additional fact that the holder
of the note became a pledgee of the treasury shares. A pledgee of ordinary
shares enjoys many of the advantages of shareholdership ( without the usual
burdens. 7 The pledge of treasury shares, as in the instant case, is, to be sure, a
unique situation." Still, it may fairly be supposed that courts will accord to
pledgees of treasury shares many of the legal attributes of ordinary pledgees. In
that event, it is submitted that since the holder of a note for treasury shareswho
is also a pledgee of those shares would enjoy a status denied a general creditor
during solvency of the corporation, it is fair to deny him the latter's status at
insolvency.
2. BALLANTINE, PRIvAm CoIu'oRATIoNs (1927) 230; Note (192o) 9 A. L. R. 1296; see
Boggs v. Fleming, 66 F. (2d) 859, 86o (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
3. 6 FIncHER, CY aoPEDA CoRPoRATioxs (Perm. ed. 1931) §2854; In re Castle Braid
Co., 145 Fed. 224 (S. D. N. Y. 19o6) ; O'Brien Mercantile Co. v. Bay Lake Fruit Growers'

Ass'n, 178 Minn. 179, 226 N. W. 513 (1929).

4. In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, I914), cert. denied, 234 U. S.
76o (1914) ; In re O'Gara and Maguire, 259 Fed. 935 (D. N. J. 1919) ; see Grasselli Chemical
Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 258 Fed. 66, 68 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
5. The commonest provision is that a corporation may purchase its own shares only out
of surplus. APE. STAT. ANN. (Castle, 1927) § I7ooy (5) ; IIL. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32,
[6; CODE OF Oio (Throckmorton, 1934) §8623-41; CoMp. LAws S. D. (1929) § 8777;
TENN. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 3722 (9).
6. National Bank v. Equitable Trust Co., 227 Fed. 526 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915), cert. denied,
239 U. S. 648 (1915), 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 521 (pledgee entitled to dividends) ; In re Citizens' Savings & Trust Co., 156 Wis. 277, 145 N. W. 646 (1914) (pledgee entitled to inspect

corporate records).
7. Henkle v. Salem Manufacturing Co., 39 Ohio St. 547 (1883)

(pledgee of stock held

not liable on statutory assessment) ; see Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 565.
8. Although the practice of a corporation's purchasing its own stock is noted as early as
1828 in the case of Hartridge v. Rocknvell, 2 R. M. Charlton 26o (Ga. 1828), it has become
extensive only since 1932. See Holt and Morris, Sone Aspects of Reacquired Stock (1934)
12 HARv. Bus. REv. 505. The volume of stock owned by corporations has grown so great
thai they are now required to list for publication monthly the amount of reacquired stock.
See N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1933, at 29, for report of the Stock Exchange which made listings
compulsory. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1934, at 27, for complete list of holdings of treasury
stock. This enormous increase in the holdings has aroused public interest in the legal attributes of treasury stock. See TIME, Oct. 21, 1935, at 59.
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Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Unexpected Decision by State Court as
Ground for Consideration by United States Supreme Court of Previously
Unargued Federal Question-Defendant, a Negro organizer for the Communist party, was indicted for the possession of Communist literature - under a
statute which made it a crime to attempt to induce others t6 join in combined
resistance to the lawful authority of the state.2 Defendant was convicted under
a charge that the statute required expectation or advocacy of immediate serious
violence to the state. The Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently held the
statute valid, in Carr v. State,3 under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 Defendant herein, after the decision in the Carr case, moved
for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence-without, however, attacking the validity of the statute. The motion was denied, and the denial
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which found the evidence sufficient
by holding, contrary to the trial court, that the Georgia insurrection statute did
not require any threat of immediate serious violence.5 On petition for rehearing, defendant vainly urged that the statute as thus construed was violative of
due process.6 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held (Cardozo,
Brandeis and Stone, JJ., dissenting), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
because a dictum in the Carr case gave sufficient notice that the Supreme Court
of Georgia was about to adopt a broader construction of the statute; and therefore the federal question should have been raised on original hearing. Herndon
v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (935), petition for rehearing denied, October 14,
1935.-7

The entrenched doctrine that the Supreme Court will decide a federal question coming from a state court only when the question has been "seasonably"
raised, here worked a striking injustice. The Court had decided in earlier cases,
that where the issue is first presented, as in the instant case, on a petition for
rehearing to the highest court of a state, the issue has been raised too late." An
obviously just exception has been, however, applied to the rule: when the federal question was raised only by an unexpected ruling of the state court of final
jurisdiction, the litigant may challenge the ruling before the United States Supreme Court, despite the fact that his earliest previous challenge came in a petition for rehearing to the highest state court.9 In holding that the present case
did not fall within this exception, the Supreme Court has implied that counsel,
in order to save a potential federal question must, henceforth, point out to the
i. Briefly, the literature indicated that the Communist party advocated confiscation of
the land of Southern landowners for the benefit of its negro tenants, recognition of a "Black
Belt" and self-determination for the Negro majority therein. See (1934) 34 COL. L. REv.
1357.
2. GA. PENAL CODE (Michie, 1926) § 56. The act was passed in x866 and amended in
,871.

3. 176 Ga. 747, 169 S. E.

201 (1933).
4. The due process clause protects the right of free speech from impairment by the
states under certain circumstances. See Gitlow v. People, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
5. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S. E. 597 (I934), 34 Coi- L. REv. 1357.
6. Herndon v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 176 S. E. 62o (934).
7. U. S. L. Week, Oct. 15, 1935, at 21.
8. Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535 (1894) ; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114
(1923). A possible rationale of the rule is the Court's desire to frustrate attempts to prolong
a case by the introduction of a federal question, when failure to present it at an earlier
moment indicates that it is probably an afterthought. See Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934 (1935) 49 HARv. L. RFv. 68, 93.
9. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317 (1917) ; Missouri ex re. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 (1930).
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trial court a less favorable construction of a statute than the court is inclined
to adopt, and thereupon except to that construction.' 0 The unfairness of such
a requirement would be slightly mitigated, if counsel was adequately warned,
at the time of the original motion for a new trial, of the interpretation that the
highest state court had adopted, or was about to adopt. But in the instant case,
as Justice Cardozo. observed, the contrary is demonstrable."
The Carr case,
which arose on demurrer to an indictment under the insurrection statute, held
simply that the statute was not unconstitutional; no question of construction
was raised. As for the dictum therein, which the Court in the instant case held
was sufficient to warn defendant of the interpretation about to be chosen, that
dictum consisted mainly of quotation from Gitlow v. People,12 an earlier case in
the United States Supreme Court. The Gitlow case upheld the constitutionality
of a state sedition statute which made certain defined types of utterances punishable as seditious,'3 interpreting such a statute to preclude further investigation by the courts concerning the dangerous tendency of the utterance.' 4 But
since the statute in the instant case made no specific condemnation of a type of
language, but merely prohibited in general terms an attempt to incite insurrection, 5 the Georgia court's exercise in quotation was scarcely adequate warning
that the court intended to enlarge, not to follow, the doctrine of the federal case
to which it paid apparent tribute. That enlargement, certainly, presented a constitutional question of grave import, and the Supreme Court is scarcely to be
commended for the assiduousness with which it went about avoiding a decision
on the question. The Court's ruling should prove distressing to those who love
consistency in the law, as well as to those who cherish the rights of free speech
and of racial minorities.

Insurance-Accident Policy-Meaning of "Death by Accidental
Means"-Insured while chopping wood was struck above the mouth by a
flying splinter, and died shortly thereafter from blood-poisoning contracted
through the wound. On suit by the beneficiary of a policy, providing for payment upon death by "accidental means", held, for plaintiff, as the injury was
not the natural or probable consequence of the insured's act. Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 18o Atl. 649 (Vt. 1935).
The meaning of the phrase "death by accidental means" is still the subject of much conflicting judicial interpretation. Out of the maze of precedents,
io. See the discussion of the instant case in Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Suprene Court, 1934 Ternit, to be published in the next issue of this REVmw.
ii. See instant case at 448 et seq.
12. 268 U. S. 652 (,925).
13. The statute involved in the Gitlow case condemned the advocacy of criminal anarchy,
reading in part as follows: "Any person who by word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized
government by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the
executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means is guilty of a felony." N. Y.
CONS. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 41, § 161.
14. This doctrine was invoked to distinguish the Gitlow case from the rule in the case
of Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (igig), where the court was construing a federal statute.
Holmes, J., said, at 52: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
15.

The statute involved in the instant case, reads as follows: "Any attempt, by persua-

sion or otherwise, to induce others to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority
of the State shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection." GA. PNAL Co (Michie,
1926) § 56.
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developed since the leading case in this field, U. S. Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Barry,'
was decided in 1889, two conflicting lines of cases can be discerned.2 One
group, represented by the instant case, accepts the simple dictionary definition
of "accident"; that it is "an unlooked for mishap." 3 Hence any death occurring
as the unintended and unexpected result of a course of conduct or events is
said to be produced by "accidental means." The other line of cases insists on a
stricter definition of "means." They hold that it is not enough that the result
be "accidental", but that the cause of the injury as well must have been unintended and unforeseen; 4 there must have been some "slip or mistake" in the
performance of the act inflicting the injury. However, many courts purportedly
adhering to this construction have imposed liability where there was no accidental factor in the chain of causation.5 Hence whatever philosophical accuracy
the latter rule may once have had, it has been dissipated by extensions and exceptions, leaving a confused mass of judicial rationalization.8 A strict construction of "accidental means", in the instant case, would necessarily have
precluded recovery; there was no "slip or mistake" in the act of swinging the
axe.7 Yet a recent federal case, while purporting to adhere to the strict rule,"
imposed liability where the insured died of blood-poisoning caused by plucking
a hair from his nose, because he did not intend to cause a wound through
which the germs could enter; thus the cause was termed accidental. To expect
the prospective buyer of accident insurance to plan an adequate scheme of coverage for dependents on the basis of a rule of law capable of such nuances as
above is to divorce the whole subject from reality.9 If the complexity of the
I. 131 U. S. I00 (889).
2. Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 3o5 Mo. 61g, 625, 267 S. W. 9o7, go8 (1924); Note
(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 762.
3. Western Com. Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 8th, I898) ; Zurich
Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Lewis v. Ocean
Acc. & Guar. Corp., 224 N. Y. i8, 120 N. E. 56 (1918).
4. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491 (I934) ; Henderson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 522, 16o N. E. 415 (1928) ; Hesse v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 299 Pa.
,25, 149 Atl. 96 (293o).

5. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brand, 265 Fed. 6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S.
496 (i92o); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, ii F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 677 (2926). But see Order of United Com. Travelers v. Shane, 64 F. (2d)
55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
6. Several conflicts of authority appear within the confines of a single jurisdiction. In
the Fourth Circuit this anomalous situation presents itself. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
ii F. (2d) 486 (1926), granted recovery where there was no "slip or mistake" in the act of
causation, because of the unknown factor of insured's hypersusceptibility to novocaine;
Zurich Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F. (2d) 853 (929), imposed liability on
the ground that wood alcohol poisoning is not the natural and probable consequence of drinking a cocktail; while Lyon v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 25 F. (2d) 596 (1928), denied
recovery because bursting a blood vessel in navigating an automobile over a rough road was
not deemed death by external and accidental means. In Pennsylvania, Bloom v. Brotherhood
Acc. Co., 85 Pa. Super. 398 (1925), permitted recovery where insured was poisoned through
an error in making up a prescription; but in Hesse v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 149
Atl. 96 (930), it was held, on facts almost identical with those in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, supra,that death was not caused by accidental means, as the act was done intentionally
without slip or mischance. A strong dissent cited Bloom v. Brotherhood Acc. Co., supra,
and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, supra.
7. See dissent of Powers, C. 3., instant case at 664.
8. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Massey, 38 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
9. "The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge
this branch of the law into a Serbonian bog." Cardozo, 3., dissenting in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 499 (1934). It has been suggested that if the insurer
wishes to make this distinction, some reference be made to it in the contract. Travelers'
Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 185 Ark. 66o, 666, 49 S. W. (2d) 364, 367 (932).
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"strict" rule deceives jurists and text-writers, 10 its meaning to the average juror
must be even more bewildering. To adopt in its place the relatively simple
concept of foreseeability borrowed from the field of negligence seems obviously
preferable.

Militia-Courts-Martial-Right of Military Authorities to Refuse to
Surrender to Civil Authorities a Militia-Man Held for Court-Martial-The
Attorney General brought habeas corpus on behalf of a sheriff to obtain the
custody of a member of the militia, on a charge of murder, from the Adjutant
General. The prisoner was being held for trial by a military court under indictment for violating the 92nd I and 93rd 2 Articles of War by committing the
homicide while on duty in flood area. Held, that the writ be denied, on the
ground that the jurisdiction of the military and civil courts is "concurrent."
McKittrick, Att'y Gen. v. Brown, 85 S. W. (2d) 385 (Mo. 1935).
An old problem in a somewhat new aspect is to be found in this case. The
respective spheres of the military and civil authorities have frequently been the
source of litigation; but, in general, the parties involved have been the civil
authorities of the state on one side and the military authorities of the federal
government on the other. These cases established the rule that the jurisdiction
of the civil and military courts is "concurrent", 3 and that the one first acquiring
jurisdiction of the accused can not be forced to surrender him. 4 When the
theories behind this and like decisions are carried to their logical conclusions,
results may be reached that should be provocative of serious thought. It would
seem that a member of the militia, who commits a homicide while on duty in
peacetime, can not be convicted of murder if his superior officers care to prevent
it. He can be held by them for court-martial-which can try him not for
murder, but only for manslaughter.- This jurisdictional limitation is immaterial when the regular army is involved, because the court-martial for manslaughter will not bar a subsequent prosecution by the state for murder-the
theory, being that the same acts constitute offenses against two jurisdictions or
sovereigns, federal and state.8 It seems to follow that when the military and
civil courts are those of the same state, the reason would fail, and therefore the
io. 6 Cooz, BRrs oN INsuPRANcE (2d ed. 1928) 5234, contains this statement: "Accidental means are those which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences." But cf. id. at 5236: "A person may do certain acts, the result of which may
produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called accidental injury; but when the means are exactly what he intended to use and used, the means are not
accidental within the meaning of the policy."
i. "Any person subject to military law who commits murder or rape shall suffer death
or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct; but no person shall be tried by
court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of
the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace."

41 STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U. S. C.

A. § 1564 (1927). In the principal case at 390 the court correctly stated that the courtmartial had no jurisdiction to try the prisoner on this charge.
2. "Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter . . . shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 41 STAT. 805 (1920), IO U. S. C. A. § 1565 (1927).
3. The word is here used loosely. In its proper sense it means the jurisdiction of different tribunals over the same offense.
4. Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559 (igio) ; Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376
(1920).

5. Note i, supra; REV. STAT. Mo. (I929) § 13831.

6. State v. Rankin, 4 Cold. 145 (Tenn. 1867) ; see Grafton v. United States, 2o6 U. S.
333, 353 (1907) ; WINTHROP, MILurARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 192o) 93. But cf. In
re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012, 1013 (905).
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accused could successfully plead former jeopardy if the civil authorities subsequently attempted to prosecute him for murder. Grafton v. United States,7 the
case most nearly in point, supports this conclusion. There the United States
Supreme Court upheld a plea of double jeopardy in a civil prosecution of a
soldier, previously acquitted by court-martial, for a homicide committed in the
Philippines. Both tribunals in this territory derived their jurisdiction and
authority from the United States. On the other hand, some authority exists to
the effect that conviction or acquittal in a court of inferior jurisdiction will not
bar prosecution in a higher court for a greater crime, inclusive of the lesser,
when the inferior court had no jurisdiction over the greater.8 Contrary to
this view, however, is the weight of case authority,9 which, together with the
more logical reasoning, supports the proposition that double jeopardy may be
successfully pleaded whenever on the indictment for the greater crime there
could be a conviction for the lesser, of which there had already been a conviction
or acquittal.1 0 The decision in the principal case threatens a fundamental tenet
of our government, the predominance of civil authority; if the courts do not
feel free to reach a more desirable social result, legislation is required.1"

Taxation-Chain Store Tax-Liability of Oil Company to Tax on
Filling Stations Operated by Licensed Dealers-Plaintiff refining company
paid under protest a chain store tax on filling stations which were leased to it by
dealers, but which were operated by the dealers under a license and contract
arrangement whereby the dealers promised to sell the company's products exclusively. The rental for the stations was paid by allowing the dealers a deduction from the price of the products, title to which passed to them on delivery
and payment. The license was revocable at the will of the company, and in
such event the equipment, title to which was in it, as well as the premises, to
which it had a right to possession under the lease, were to be delivered over by
7. 206 U. S. 333 (1907).

8. Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931) (conviction in municipal court for the misdemeanor of indecent assault not a bar to prosecution for rape in the
superior court) ; Huffman v. State, 84 Miss. 479, 36 So. 395 (19o4) (conviction in justice's
court for assault and battery not a bar to prosecution in the circuit court for assault and battery with intent to kill) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Curtis, Thach. Cr. Cas. 202, 206 (Mass. 1829)
(a person "can not plead an acquittal or conviction of an inferior offense in bar of an indictment for a higher offense, although each was part of the same act, unless a conviction of the
crime of manslaughter which is a bar to a second indictment for murder, be an exception to
the rule").
9. AmERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE-DOuBLE JEOPARDY (0935)
§ 17; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907) ; Moore v. State, 71 Ala. 3o7 (1882) ;
State v. Mowser, 92 N. J. L. 474, io6 Atl. 416 (Sup. Ct. 1918). Contra: Commonvealth v.
Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 165 Atl. 498 (933).
As long as the Pennsylvania courts adhere to
the rule that former jeopardy can be pleaded only in cases involving capital offenses, the
situation in the principal case will present no difficulties in this state.
IO. In Missouri a person, under indictment for murder, may be convicted of manslaughter: State v. Farrel, 320 Mo. 319, 6 S. W. (2d) 857 (928).
II. A more satisfactory solution might be attained by adopting a factual approach.
There would seem to be no case, other than the principal one, squarely holding that the civil
authorities can not obtain the custody of the accused from the military when both tribunals
derive their authority from the same sovereign. Undesirable consequences, not present in
the dual jurisdictional case, should cause the court to refrain from extending the rule laid
down in such cases to the facts of the principal case. On this basis habeas corpus could have
been granted. It is probable, however, that the reasoning and the result in the principal case
represent the reaction of the average court when confronted with this problem under the
present state of the law.
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the dealer. Under the statute 1 a tax had to be paid on each unit "owned, operated, maintained and/or controlled" by the same person, etc. Held, that the tax
had been properly levied, because the refining company "controlled" the filling
stations within the meaning of the statute. Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, ii F.
Supp. 425 (W. Va. 1935).
Although filling stations have been held not to be "stores" or "merchantile
establishments" within the meaning of at least one chain store tax statute, 2 they
have been held to be such under the statute in question 3 and one nearly identical
with it." The only question here before the court, therefore, was whether the
relationship between the dealers and the company was such as to render the
former part of the latter's "chain." It has been held that filling station operators, under differing arrangements affording refining companies varying degrees of control somewhat stricter than that in the instant case, were employees
for purposes of tort liability.5 However, the court in the instant case expressly
stated that it would not be governed by the rules regulating the degree of control
necessary to establish respondeat superior, or by interpretations of "control" as
used in other statutes. Hence, the control that is necessary to bring an alleged
unit within a "chain" for purposes of the several tax statutes is apparently
subject to broad interpretation. Two situations beside the one under discussion
have reached the courts and been held to afford the requisite control under tax
statutes to the refining company.6 In each of these varying situations, including
the instant case, the power to terminate the company-dealer relationship rested in
the company, which thus had a strong means of enforcing any of its dictates upon
the dealers. It is submitted, however, that the probable and very proper criterion
in such cases will be whether the degree of control is sufficient to give the company the economic advantages commonly enjoyed by chain stores.7
I. W. Va. Acts 1933, c. 36. The constitutionality of such statutes is now well settled.
State v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (931) ; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (933) ; Note
(1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 289.
2. Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 21o Wis. 448, 245 N. W. 646 (1933), interpreting Wis.
Acts Spec. Sess. 1931, c. 29.
3. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1934), interpreting W. Va. Acts 1933, c. 36,
cited note i, supra. It should be noted that in the passage of this bill through the West Virginia Senate an amendment was proposed whereby the term "store" should not include filling
stations, which amendment was rejected. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 96.
4. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State, 2o6 Ind. 688, 187 N. E. 882 (1933), interpreting
Ind. Laws 1929, C.207.
5. Greene v. Spinning, 48 S. W. (2d) 51 (Mo. App. 1932) (dealer leased the station to
the refining company, rental being paid by a deduction from the price of the products to the
dealer; the company reserved the right to terminate the lease at any time; the company
owned the equipment; title passed to the products on delivery and payment; the dealer paid
his own employees; and many restrictions were placed by the company on the dealer's operation of the station); Coffman v. Shell Petroleum Co., 288 Mo. App. 727, 71 S. W. (2d) 97
(1934) (the station and equipment were leased to the company by the dealer, and strict control over the dealer's operation of the station was granted to the company).
6. Midwestern Petroleum Co. v. State, 206 Ind. 688, 187 N. E. 882 (933), interpreting
Ind. Laws 1929, c. 207 (stations were leased by the refining company to the dealer, the company reserving the right to cancel, and rental usually being paid in cash; title to the products
passed on sale and delivery; and the dealer hired and paid his own employees) ; Ashland Refining Co. v. Fox, ii F. Supp. 431 (W. Va. 1935) (a companion suit to the instant case, in
which stations were leased from the dealer to the company and leased back again to the
dealer; a limited agency agreement existed between the parties; both the lease from the company to the dealer and the agency agreement were subject to cancellation by either party;
and the company owned the equipment).
7. For a full discussion of the advantages inherent in the chain store by which it may be
distinguished from other types of business organization, see State v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527,
pp. 532-541 (931).
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Taxation-Collection-State Exemption of Insurance Policy Proceeds
-Right of United States to Distrain on Cash Value for Delinquent TaxesA life insurance policy reserved to the insured the power to change the beneficiary, and the option to receive the cash surrender value. A state statute exempted the proceeds of such policies from the claims of creditors of the insured.1 The Collector of Internal Revenue, to secure payment of the insured's
income taxes, issued a warrant of distraint on the cash value of the policy.2
Wife beneficiary filed a petition to quash this warrant. Held, that the prayer
of the petition be granted, because the effect of the statute was to vest the property in the beneficiary. McGuirk v. Kyle, io F. Supp. 705 (E. D. Pa. 1934).
Held, that the prayer be denied, because the exemption conferred was not
recognized by Federal law. Cannon v. Nicholas, io F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo.
1934) .

The problem raised in these cases is a novel one. The theory of the court
in the McGuirk case was that the exemption statute secured to the beneficiary
a vested property right in the proceeds of the policy, even though the insured
reserved the power to change the beneficiary; hence, the insured being said to
have no interest in the cash value, it was not subject to distraint for payment of
his debts. On the other hand, the court in the Cannon case reasoned that it was
an exemption statute, which as such could not affect the United States unless
allowed by Federal law. 4 It is submitted that the latter construction of the
statute is literally correct, but that the former construction, though strained,
effects the more desirable result. It is generally held that where the insured
reserves the power to change the beneficiary, the latter acquires no property
rights in the policy, but a mere expectancy. 5 The plain purpose of exemption
statutes, therefore, was to secure to the beneficiaries, the wife or family of the
insured, the proceeds of such policies free from the claims of his creditors. 6
To avoid the difficulty which would follow from labelling these laws as exemption statutes, and to give effect to the legislative intent, the court in the
McGuirk case treated the statute as though it vested in the beneficiary the property rights in the policy. A similar approach has frequently been used by
state courts in analogous situations, the state transfer tax cases.' In the instant
cases, however, the warrant could have been quashed on other grounds. It is
well settled that the status of the Federal government in distraint proceedings
is that of an attaching creditor,8 and that the warrant of distraint is an analogue
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
right's Mills, 193o) § 3592a (1929).

1930) tit. 40,

§ 517

(1923);

CoLo. STAT. ANN.

(Court-

2. Under authority of 43 STAT. 343 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 116 (1928). In the Cannon
case the Collector distrained on the policy and advertised it for sale. Since the purchaser's
only claim could be to the cash value, the distraint was, in effect, on such value.
3. Neither case was reported until July, 1935.
4. It is well settled that, in general, exemptions granted by a state will not apply to a
debt due from a citizen to the United States. Bank of thq United States v. Halstead, 1o
Wheat. 51, 63 (U. S. 1821); United States v. Howell, 9 Fed. 674 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1881);
I. T. 1683, I-I Cum. Bull. 172.
5. VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 136; see Vance, The Benwficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 343, 359; see id. at 36o, where the author suggests that
the doctrine of vested rights should be applied "to safeguard the interests of married women
and children in the proceeds of insurance carried for their benefit." The leading case contra
is Tyler v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917).
6. Such statutes are liberally construed by the courts in favor of the insured as against
creditors in order to encourage men to insure their lives for the benefit of their families.
7. Matter of Voorhees, 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168 (3d Dep't 1922). The
federal law is contra: Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1927).
8. See United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 5o F. (2d) 1O2, 1O4 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931) (ordinary procedure to enforce right of a judgment creditor must be followed by
the United States when seeking to enforce a tax lien) ; United States v. Bank of United
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of the writ of attachment or garnishment. By the weight of authority, when
an insurance policy reserves to the insured the option, among others, to receive
the cash value, until he exercises his option there is no debt due him which can
be garnished. 10 These options are personal to the insured. A creditor cannot
choose for him which option he shall exercise; "1 nor will a court of equity
compel him to apply for the cash surrender value.1 2 Accordingly, since the
insured, in the instant cases, had not exercised his option at the time of the
issuance of the writ of distraint, there was an adequate legal ground for quashing it. Likewise, it would seem that though the considerations are conflicting,
the social desirability of protecting the dependents of the insured justifies this
result.13

Taxation-Governmental Immunity-Power of a State to Tax Shares
of Stock Held by a Federal Governmental Agency-Reconstruction Finance
Corporation owned all preferred stock of defendant national bank, which contended the shares were immune from state and municipal taxation. The federal
statute which created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation exempted "the
corporation, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus" from taxation. 2 Held, that the statute merely expressed the usual rule of governmental
immunity, and that this did not apply to such shares. Baltimore Nat. Bank v.
State Tax Comm. of Maryland, i8o Ati. 260 (Md. 1935), cert. granted by U. S.
Sup. Ct., 3 U. S. L. Week 88 (Oct. 15, 1935).
The rule that the instrumentality of one sovereign must be immune from
taxation by the other has no express constitutional basis, but has developed from
Supreme Court decisions 3 as a necessary element of sovereignty in our dual
form of government. In applying this rule the Supreme Court has varied between a doctrinal approach which seems to condemn any tax levied on a governmental instrumentality, and an economic analysis which tends to allow the
States, 5 F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) (United States, in serving distraint warrant on
taxpayer's bank account, has the status of an attaching creditor).
9. S. M. 38o4A, V-i Cum. Bull. Iio.
io. Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 79 App. Div. 6oi,
8o N. Y. Supp. 428 (Ist Dep't 19o3) ; First National Bank v. Friend, 23 S. W. (2d) 482
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
ii. Farmers and M. Bank v. National Life Insurance Co.,

i61

Ga. 793, 131 S. E.

9o2

(1926) ; Van Dyke v. Moll, 241 Mich. 255, 217 N. W. 29 (i928) ; cf. Jones v. Clifton, ioi
U. S. 225 (1879) (where there is a bona fide transfer of property and insurance to wife with
power of revocation reserved to the grantor, such power is not available to creditors of the
grantor to secure a return of that property and insurance).
12.

National Bank of Commerce v. Appel Clothing Co., 35 Colo. i49, 83 Pac. 965 (i9o5);

Maurice v. Travelers Insurance Co., 121 Misc. 427, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
13. Fundamentally, the courts, in the instant cases, were faced with two conflicting in-

terests: the claim of the sovereign to freedom in collecting revenue, and the desire of the
state to prevent the insured's family from becoming a public charge. In the exact situation
presented it would appear desirable to subordinate the former interest to the latter, especially
because insurance is often the only provision that the insured has made for his dependents.
and also because the cash value, usually small in amount, is of little moment in meeting the
insured's obligations, but is the foundation of the beneficiary's rights, since its removal destroys the policy.
i. It is settled practice for a bank or other corporation to litigate a question of taxability
on behalf of its stockholders. Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 (1923).
2. 47 STAT. 5, 9 (1932), is U. S. C. A. §§ 6oi, 6Io (Supp. i934). This was the act cre-

ating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
3. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig) (holding federal instrumentalities free from state taxation) ; Collector v. Day, ii Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870) (originating
doctrine that state instrumentalities are exempt from federal taxation).
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tax where the burden on the governmental function is slight.4 The rule of doctrinal immunity came first, but was later limited by the establishment of a distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions q-the latter being
described as a function involving business of a private character.6 It has been
soundly argued that this distinction is illogical, because any function which a
government may constitutionally perform is a "governmental" function.7 However, in the past few years, several decisions of the United States Supreme
Court seem to have taken the preferable view that the test should be the weight
of the burden imposed on the governmental function by the tax.'
The result of the instant case, clearly invalid under the "doctrinal" view,9
would also seem to be contrary to the "burden" theory, because the burden
would be borne entirely by the federal government, whereas taxes on governmental functions have been allowed, under this theory, only where they place
the main burden on private property and only a slight burden on the governmental function.10
Torts-Duty of Employer to Control Employees-Liability of Company Operating Store for Negligence of Employees When Manager Participates-Employees in defendant's chain grocery store, including the manager, and a schoolboy who had come into the store with a rifle, went to the basement of the store, where they took turns shooting at a target on a door leading
to the street. Some of the shots penetrated the door, one killing plaintiff's
husband, who was walking along the street. Held, for defendant, on the ground
that although the manager's knowledge that dangerous activities were about to
take place on the premises was imputable to defendant, the manager's abandonment of his employment by participating in the frolic deprived defendant of an
opportunity to prevent such conduct.
243, 197 N. E. 266 (1935).'

Ford v. Grand Union Co., 268 N. Y.

4. Note (1934) 47 HAgv. L. REV. 12o9. For a full discussion of the rule and decisions
under it see Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of
Federal Activities (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 8o7; Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
and Federal and State Taxation in IntergovernnentalRelations-93o-I932 (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 247, 256-266; Note (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 194.
5. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905) (upholding federal power to
tax a state-operated liquor dispensing system). Accord: Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360
(1934) ; Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934) ; North Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929). It has frequently been held that this test does not apply to the federal
government in time of emergency, such as war. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S.
(1923) ; New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 (1928).
6. North Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848, 851 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
7. Cohen and Dayton, loc. cit. supra note 4.
8. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) ; Denman v. Slayton, 282 U. S.
514, 519 (i93i) ; Fox Films Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932), overruling Long v. Lockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928); Group No. i Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 (93); cf. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922) ; Burnett v. Corondo Oil Co., 285 U. S. 393 (1932).
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For a long time this test has been applied to state taxes attacked as burdens on interstate
commerce. Eastern Air Transp. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Com., 285 U. S. 147 (1932).
9. The case would not fall into the so-called "proprietary" exception to the "doctrinal"
view because the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was organized to meet an emergency,
Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923) (property of U. S. Spruce Corp. held
not taxable by a state) ; New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 (1928) (same as to
U. S. Housing Corp.), and because it is not in competition with private business, North Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, i92g) (federal government may tax a state
owned bank).
IO. See cases cited supra note 8.
i. Judgment nonsuiting plaintiff had been reversed by the Appellate Division, on the
ground that whether failure to prevent use of the basement for target practice was an omis-

RECENT CASES

While an employer is ordinarily not liable for the torts of his employees
acting outside the scope of their employment, 2 he may incur liability through
failure to exercise reasonable care to restrain them in such negligent acts when
on his premises or using his chattels, if he knows of the likelihood of harm to
others and has an opportunity to exercise the necessary control." Where the
authority to control activities on the premises is delegated to an agent, the employer should similarly be liable for injuries resulting from the agent's negligent failure to exercise control. 4 Although the decision in the instant case was
consistent with general rules of agency, the case seems to have turned on a
rather fine distinction. If it is desirable to hold the employer for the manager's mere inaction, a somewhat greater defection with the same effect should
not confer immunity; for in spite of the latter's departing from his employment
in one particular, his general power to control persisted. Where a truck driver
without authority permitted another to drive for him and failed to supervise his
driving, the New York court held the employer liable to a person injured by the
substitute's recklessness, on the ground that the driver's general power of supervision continued in spite of the unauthorized substitution, and that his negligence in failing to exercise it was a cause of the collision and a negligent omission within the scope of his employment.5 Similar reasoning could have been
employed in the instant case with a more satisfactory result.

Torts-Negligence--Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur Rule to Injury
Caused by Falling of Plaster from Ceiling-Plaintiff's declaration alleged
that he was lawfully, and by defendant's invitation, in a pool room owned and
operated by defendant, when he was injured by a piece of plaster falling from
the ceiling. On demurrer to the declaration, held, for defendant, because under
the circumstances alleged the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
Thompson v. Cooles, 18o Atl. 522 (Del. Super. Ct. 1935).
Expressly refusing to be influenced by the weight of authority in other
states, the court in the instant case held inapplicable a rule which has been uniformly applied under the same circumstances by those courts wherein the question of plaster falling on a business visitor has been adjudicated.1 The mere
sion within the manager's scope of employment was a question for the jury. Ford v. Grand

Union Co., 240 App. Div. 294, 270 N. Y. Supp. 162 (3d Dep't 1934), rediction of damages
on retrial rev'd, Ford v. Grand Union Co., 243 App. Div. 255, 277 N. Y. Supp. 105 (3d Dep't

1935).

2. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)

§ 219 (2).

3. Hogle v. Franklin, igg N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (i91o) (employer who knew that
workmen had practice of maliciously throwing missiles onto adjoining land and failed to
stop them held liable to persons injured thereby) ; REsTATE ENT, ToRTs (934Y § 317. Id.
§ 318 imposes a similar duty upon owner of land or chattels, when present, to control the
conduct of licensees (as the schoolboy in the instant case).
4. The court in the instant case (at 253, 197 N. E. at 271) recognized the validity of the
proposition as a rule applicable in some instances.
5. Grant v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 65o (1927). Followed in Conway v. Pickering, ii N. J. L. 15, 166 Atl. 76 (i933). Grant v. Knepper was not mentioned in the instant case.
i. Bonita Theatre v. Bridges, 31 Ga. App. 798, 122 S. E. 255 (1924); Law v. Morris,'

N. J. L. 650, 133 Atl. 427 (1926) ; Morris v. Zimmerman, 138 App. Div. 114, 122 N. Y.
Supp. 9oo (ist Dep't igio) ; Halterman v. Hansard, 4 Ohio App. 268 (I915) ; Taylor v.
Popular Dry Goods Co., io S. W. (2d) 1gI (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). It is worth bearing in
mind that the leading case on which the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris said to rest-Byrne v.
Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722 (Ex. 1863)-involved an injury caused by the falling of a barrel. It
may be for this reason that the courts in general have shown little hesitation in applying the
rule in a wide variety of cases wherein an injury has been caused by the unexplained fall of
2o2
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fact that an injury has occurred on the defendant's premises, to be sure, creates
no presumption of negligence on his part.2 In the instant case, however, not
only was the cause of the injury within the exclusive knowledge and control of
the defendant, but he was under a duty of reasonable inspection to see that his
premises were safe for the plaintiff as a business visitor.3 From these circumstances the fairest conclusion would seem to be, in contradiction of the Delaware decision, that in the ordinary course of human experience plaster does not
usually fall from ceilings which have been reasonably inspected by the person
in control.

Trusts-Creation under Agreement Initiated by State Agricultural
Adjustment Act-Duty of Intermediary in Possession of Fund at Time the
Act is Declared Unconstitutional-The Washing-ton Agricultural Adjustment Act 1 associated farmers and agricultural product dealers in a marketing
agreement, whereby assessments borne by the farmers were deducted from
money due them from the dealers. The latter paid the assessments to an Executive Board, which applied the fund to purposes presumably of benefit to the
farmers, as specified in the agreement. Defendant, a dealer, had an assessment fund on hand when the statute was declared unconstitutional, 2 for which
fund the state brought suit. Held, that recovery be denied, because the assessments were not taxes for support of the government. State v. Matson Co., 47
P. (2d) 1003 (Wash. 1935).

The marketing agreement, by virtue of which the assessments were collected, would seem to be the pivotal factor for determining who has the right
to the assessment fund. By reference to the terms of the agreement, it would
appear that the state was properly denied recovery, since the asserted duty of
the dealer as agent of the state is inconsistent with the fact that the assessments
were not for support of the government. Recovery on agency principles is also
to be denied under the doctrine that a statute's being held unconstitutional destroys any possible fiduciary relationship ab initio.3 Nor could the state recover
on the theory of escheat, since at common law escheat has generally been limited
to the case of unclaimed funds of a decedent. 4 The problem of whether the
farmer may recover the fund from the dealer, though it was not raised in the
instant case, is one of impending significance, and may soon be adjudicated.5
some object: Mayes v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 121 Kan. 648, 249 Pac. 599 (1926)
(street light globe) ; De Mun Estate Corp. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. I, 187
S. W. 1124 (ii6) (falling cornice); Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E.
403 (1896) (piece of iron from elevated railway) ; see cases collected in Note (1924) 33 A.
L. R. 181, 2oo, and in 45 C. J. 12O n. 21 (c).
2. Garland v. Furst Store 93 N. J. L. 127, io7 Atl. 38 (1919) ; Spickernagle v. Wool-

worth,
3.

236

Pa. 496, 84 Atl.

RE TATE

909 (1912).

ENT, TORTS

(1934) § 343.

i. Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 12.

Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 46 P. (2d) 983 (Wash. 1935).
3. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (1885); Drum v. University Place Water
District, 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (927).
4. 3 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) § 1867. The application of escheat is
further limited by the tendency of the courts to disfavor it wherever possible, and to prevent
its application where there is doubt. In re McManis' Estate, 94 Colo. 546, 31 P. (2d) 912
(934).
5. The problem will probably arise if the United States Supreme Court declares unconstitutional the National Agricultural Adjustment Act, H. R. Rep. No. 3835, 73d Cong., ist
Sess., Ser. No. IO (1933) 25.
2.

RECENT CASES

Even though the farmer cannot recover upon legal principles,6 equity may grant
him relief if he has an equitable claim capable of being remedied upon equitable
principles. 7 The equity is clear-the dealer would otherwise be unjustly enriched at the expense of the farmer.8 The equitable principles necessary to
supply the remedy are dependent upon the interpretation of the marketing agreement which, it is believed, is susceptible of varying constructions. The agreement might be said to have made the dealer an agent of the farmer for payment
of the assessments," thus making the dealer accountable as constructive trustee
of the funds of his principal. 10 Again, it may be recognized that the marketing
agreement created a trust in the Executive Board for the farmer.1 ' The dealer's
position, in the light of his duty to collect the assessments, is then that of agent
of the Executive Board, and as such, he is to be charged with knowledge of
the trust character of the funds he holds. The dealer will then be subject to the
trust and to the rights of the farmer as beneficiary under the trust.1 2 Good
conscience requires that the farmer should recover and, if one of the above constructions of the marketing agreement be accepted, equity will provide the
remedy.
6. Voluntary payments under mistake of law cannot be recovered. Mowatt v. Wright,
I Wend. 355 (N. Y. 1828); 2 GREENLEAF, EvIDENcE (16th ed. 18pg) § 123; 2 POMEROY,
EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. I905) § 851; cf. Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Ballinger, 54 F.
(2d) 296 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
7. "A Court of equity has . . . power to relieve against payment of money in mistake of law, if there is any equitable ground which makes it under the particular facts of the
case inequitable that the party who received the money should retain it." KERR, FRAUD AND
MISTAKE (6th ed. 1929) 583.
8. Marketing Agreement, Order 128, art. V, § (b) recites that the assessment is made
to defray the expenses of the activities of the various groups. Since the activities are in-

tended to result in a benefit to the farmer, he may justly expect the assessments to return to
him in some beneficial form. When the assessments are retained by the dealer, the farmer
undergoes the loss of benefits he would have received had the original agreement been fulfilled, and the assessments in furtherance thereof expended by the Executive Board.
9.Marketing Agreement, Order 128, art. V, § (c) provides that the dealer shall pay the
assessment to the Executive Board, and that he shall be reimbursed by the farmer. Such
language may well indicate that the dealer is acting for the farmer in the payment of the
assessment, i. e., is acting as the farmer's agent.
io. Cook v. Flagg, 255 Fed. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) ; Allen v. Sarshik, 299 Pa. 257, 148
Atl.

25

(193o) ; cf. McKee v. Lamon, 159 U. S.317 (1895), in which an express direction to

another to deliver money to a third person was held to create a trust.

ii. The assessment fund in the hands of the Executive Board was to be used for the

benefit of the farmers. This fact may well stamp the fund with the character of a trustjust as a fund, recovered by a deceased's personal representative under a statute permitting
recovery for wrongful death, is regarded as a trust for the benefit of the next of kin. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U. S.599 (1915); Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y.
343, 114 N. E. 399 (1916). For a further discussion of trusts created by statute, see 2
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (935)
§ 254.
12. One who obtains property from a trustee,

knowing of its trust character, is subject
to the trust and to the rights of the beneficiary thereunder. Bancroft Trust Co. v. Federal

Nat. Bank of Boston, 9 F. Supp. 350 (D. Mass. 1934) ; Central Arizona Light and Power
Co. v. Meek, 4o Ariz. 255, Ii P. (2d) 85o (1932).

